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Article
The Role of Women Entrepreneurs in Rebuilding
a Nation: the Rwandan Model
Karen E. Woody and Abbey R. Stemler*
The women of Rwanda have shown, for the first time in
history, what can happen when women, and the full
measure of their talents, are included in peace building.
-Ambassador

Swanee Hunti

INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five
years
ago,
Rwanda
experienced
an
unprecedented human rights atrocity. In just one hundred days
in the spring and early summer of 1994, over 800,000 Rwandans
were killed by their fellow countrymen and women. 2 The dead
totaled nearly eleven percent of the country's population. 3 What
was horrifically unique about the Rwandan genocide was the
number of citizen killers. 4 These individuals used rudimentary
means to slaughter their neighbors and fellow community
members. Families, friendships, communities, and an entire

* Assistant Professors of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University
Kelley School of Business. The authors would like to thank Timothy L. Fort,
Beth Samuelson, the Indiana University Cinema, and the incredible staff of the
Minnesota Journalof InternationalLaw for their contributions to this article.
1. Two Decades After the Genocide: How Women Rebuilt Rwanda,
INCLUSIVE SECURITY, https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/how-women-rebuiltrwanda/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
2. Aneta Wierzynska,
Note,
Consolidating Democracy Through
TransitionalJustice: Rwanda's Gacaca Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1934, 1934
n.2 (2004).
3. Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide:From Guilt to Shame to
Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (2000).
4. The term "citizen killer" as applied here refers to non-military
perpetrators of a coordinated killing. See generally MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN
VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN

RWANDA (2001).
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country, were torn apart within the course of three months. And
with a fifty percent drop in GDP in 1994, the country's economy
also was in shambles.5 After the genocide, the task of rebuilding
community trust and economic stability was beyond daunting.
Amazingly, Rwanda now has one of the fastest-growing
economies in Africa, and has sustained peace since the
genocide. 6 Rwandan women played a key role in this remarkable
turnaround because women have had an outsized impact on the
reestablishment of the rule of law, particularly as it relates to
adjudicating war crimes, and the creation of an inclusive legal
regime that empowers them.7 The convergence of these two
forces produced a fertile entrepreneurial environment, which
helped women move out of poverty, improve the health and
education outcomes of their families, and forge sustainable
peace.
This Article contributes to the literature by analyzing the
normative shifts within the country's institutions, both pre- and
post-genocide, and observes the role of women in restructuring
the institutions as a major factor in the success that Rwanda
enjoys today. By prioritizing gender equality in the recreation of
its legal and economic structures, Rwanda is able to leverage the
talents and capabilities of its entire population, and provides a
model that can be applied to a number of other countries.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I details the historical
underpinnings of the Rwandan genocide and humanitarian
crisis. Part II addresses the efforts to establish the rule of law in
the aftermath of such a tragedy and describes the novel use of
an indigenous forum for conflict resolution, gacaca, and the
impact that this type of judicial experiment had on women in
particular. Part III analyzes how Rwanda created a legal
environment that empowers women. Part IV analyzes how the
combination of reestablishing the rule of law through gacaca and
5. WORLD BANK, RWANDA POVERTY NOTE, REBUILDING AN EQUITABLE
SOCIETY: POVERTY AND POVERTY REDUCTION AFTER THE GENOCIDE (1998),

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/255161467
998828941/pdf/100631WP-Pl24629-PUBLIC-Box393238B-Rwanda-PovertyAssessment-Final.pdf.
6. Top 10 Fastest Growing Economies in Africa 2018, IT NEWS AFR. (May
4, 2018), http://www.itnewsafrica.com/2018/05/top-10-fastest-growing-econom
ies-in-africa-2018.
7. This Article adopts Nalia Kabeer's definition of "empowerment," which
she defines as "the expansion in people's ability to make strategic life choices in
a context where this ability was previously denied." Naila Kabeer, Resources,
Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurements of Women's
Empowerment, 30 DEV. & CHANGE 435, 437 (1999).
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an empowering legal environment helped sparked an economic
rebirth within Rwanda, and promoted peace. While some details
of Rwandan society post-genocide may be unique, this Part also
outlines how the lessons from Rwanda can be applied more
broadly and make a contribution to our understanding of how
and
transitional
justice,
influence
peace,
women
entrepreneurship.

I. HISTORY OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
In order to appreciate the importance of entrepreneurship
in peace-building and economic development, it is important to
understand the relevant culture and history of a region. Rwanda
has a particularly unique history that informs the often-fraught
relationships among its citizens. This Part details the history of
ethnic conflict prior to the genocide, as well as the events of the
genocide of 1994 in Rwanda.

A.

ETHNIC VIOLENCE PRE-GENOCIDE

Rwanda is a small, densely populated, and landlocked
country in Central Africa. 8 Rwanda moved to the center of the
world stage in 1994 because of the horrific level of violence that
occurred during the genocide. The events of 1994, however, did
not mark the first outbreak of ethnic violence among Rwandans.
Rather, acute ethnic tension preceded the 1994 genocide and
dates back at least to the colonial period in the early 1900s. From
1919 until 1962, Rwanda was a Belgium colony, acquired from
Germany after World War I.9 Despite the fact that there were
many commonalities among the people of Rwanda, including
language and religion, the Belgian colonialists imposed clear
racial boundaries between the country's two ethnic groups, the
Hutu and Tutsi. 10

8. CIA, Africa: Rwanda, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print rw.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
9. See, e.g., JEAN-PIERRE CHRtTIEN, THE GREAT LAKES OF AFRICA: Two
THOUSAND YEARS OF HISTORY 281-88 (Scott Straus trans., 2003). Prior to
colonial rule, Rwanda had a monarchy. However, when the Germans colonized
in the late nineteenth century, they instilled a colonial policy of indirect rule,
allowing the Rwandan monarchy to transition slowly. GERARD PRUNIER, THE
RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 25-26 (1998).
10. See PRUNIER, supra note 9, at 25; Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass
Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as TransitionalJustice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1,
26 (2006). Waldorf points out that both Hutu and Tutsi speak the same
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The Belgian colonialists institutionalized the differences
between the ethnicities, and even established racial identity
cards. 11 In the eyes of the colonialists, the Tutsi were the
pastoralist cattle-owners 12 who held power over the Hutu
cultivators. 13 The Belgian colonialists viewed the Tutsi as
''racially superior" because of their similarities to tribes from
Ethiopia, 14 and installed the Tutsi in power. 15 This meant
removing any Hutu from positions of power, and prohibiting
them from participating in higher education. 16 Thus, the Tutsi
were anointed by the Belgian colonialists as the ruling class, and
essentially remained in power until 1959.17
In the 1950s, colonial rule across the globe faded.18 The
United Nations began pressuring the colonial administrators in
Rwanda to allow Hutu to participate in the administration and
in education. 19 The Rwandan ruler, Mutara III Rudahigwa, who
language, share the same culture, practice the same religion and live amongst
each other. As such, Hutu and Tutsi alike have somewhat "fluid identities based
largely on socio-political status and economic activity."
11. See Drumbl, supranote 3, at 1244 ("Ultimately, it was this construction
of ethnicity that lay at the root of the violence.") (emphasis added); Waldorf,
supra note 10, at 26.
12.

ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN

RWANDA 32 (1999). The term "Tutsi" originally meant someone rich in cattle
and referred simply to an elite person, rather than to a particular ethnicity.
Similarly, "Hutu" originally meant subordinate or follower.
13. Id.
14. See MAMDANI, supra note 4, at 80.
15. See PRUNIER, supra note 9, at 6. Prunier writes that the Tutsi were
extremely tall and thin, often displayed a sharp angular face, and seemed vastly
different from the Hutu who resembled the neighboring Uganda and Tanzanian
natives. However, the Tutsi and Hutu often intermarried so the physical
differences became less stark than the early colonialists described.
16. DES FORGES, supra note 12, at 35. Des Forges notes that the Belgian
colonialists also removed women from either ethnicity from positions of power.
She also points out that the only Hutu who were excused from the "laboring
masses" were those engaged in religious study.
17. Waldorf, supra note 10, at 27; see also PRUNIER, supra note 9, at 27
(noting that toward the end of Belgian rule, in 1959, 43 out of 45 chiefs were
Tutsi, and 549 out of 559 subchiefs were Tutsi, replacing many Hutu chiefs and
subchiefs). Prunier also explains that prior to colonial rule, there were typically
three chiefs on each hill, one of whom was the Chief of the Land and was often
a Hutu. In 1929, the three chiefs were merged into a single position which was
almost always occupied by a Tutsi. Id.
18. Office of the Historian, Decolonizationof Asia and Africa, 1945-1960,
U.S. DEP'T STATE, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945- 1952/asia-andafrica (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
19. DES FORGES, supra note 12, at 38; see also PRUNIER, supra note 9, at
33. The number of Tutsi students to Hutu students in the Rwanda college in
1945 was 46 to 3. In 1954, it was 63 to 19. In 1959, however, the number was
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had been the chief administrator since 1931, died suddenly in
1959, leaving his younger half-brother, Kigeli V Ndahindurwa,
in charge. 20 The new leadership was more conservative Tutsi
and did not prioritize any Hutu-Tutsi political alliances. This
shift sparked violence among the Tutsi and Hutu, and the
Belgian administration had to step in to restore order. 21 The
violence of 1959 sparked the beginning of what was deemed the
"peasant uprising" of the Hutu. In 1960 and 1961, the Hutu
party won the first elections and voted to end all ties with the
Rwanda monarchy, thereby establishing a republic in January
1961, with Belgium colonialists officially leaving the country in
1962.22

The "Peasant Uprising" from 1959-62 resulted in many
Tutsi leaving Rwanda or being killed. 23 Many of the Tutsi

refugees attacked the Hutu government periodically, and ethnic
violence continued sporadically. In 1973, Hutu General Juv6nal
Habyarimana, in an effort to restore order and national unity,
took over the country in a bloodless coup by the military. 24
Habyarimana made Rwanda a one-party state and all
25
Rwandans were automatic members of the party.

In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front ("RPF"), a rebel group
comprised of Rwandan Tutsi living in Uganda, attacked the
Rwandan government and sparked a four-year civil war. 26 Then
President Habyarimana attempted, with Hutu extremists, to
solidify the Hutu population under the extreme ideological
principle of Hutu Power. 27 Operating under this principle, the
government provoked Tutsi killings in 1991, 1992, and 1993.28

279 to 143.
20. DES FORGES, supra note 12, at 38-39.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 40. Waldorf, supra note 10, at 30 ("Hutu political elites whipped
up violence against Tutsi minority ... in four distinct periods (1959-64, 73, 9093, and the 1994 genocide).").
24. DES FORGES, supra note 12, at 41.
25. Waldorf, supra note 10, at 30 n.157.
26. Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the U.N., Rwanda:
A Brief History of the Country, https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/
historical-background.shtml (last visited May 30, 2019).
27. DES FORGES, supra note 12, 41.
28. The Hutu Power bloc used radical propaganda to dehumanize the Tutsi.
The Kinyarwanda word "inyenzi" was invoked in reference to Tutsi and literally
translates to "cockroach." The term was first used in the 1960s to describe the
Tutsi invading after the peasant uprising, and was revived in the 1990s to refer
to members of the RPF and the Tutsi in general. DES FORGES, supra note 12, at

372

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW

[Vol. 28:2

B. THE GENOCIDE

On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying President Habyarimana
and members of his staff, as well as the President of Burundi,
was shot down over Kigali, triggering the 1994 genocide. 29 Hutu
extremists quickly took over the government and military, and
began the systemic killing spree that lasted until July 1994.30
Fueled by government propaganda promulgating racial
stereotypes of the Tutsi, citizens turned on each other in acts of
inhumane brutality, resulting in the death of over 800,000
people, mostly Tutsi. 31 The wide-scale participation of citizens
made the Rwandan genocide depressingly unique, and created a
deep fissure within communities and among neighbors.
Communities were devastated because not only were
neighbors turning against neighbors, but the violence was
intensely "personal" in that it often involved the use of machetes,
or panga, or large clubs studded with nails, masu. 32 Despite this
time-consuming and emotional method of killing, the death rate
in Rwanda rose at a rate nearly "three times the rate of the
Jewish dead during the Holocaust." 33 According to Professor
Mark A. Drumbl, the reason was simple: "[s]o many people were
34
killed principally because there were so many killers."
In July 1994, the RPF managed to wrest control from the
35
Hutu regime and regain control of Kigali, Rwanda's capital.

51; Waldorf, supra note 10, at 30; see also George B.N. Ayittey, The NonSustainabilityof Rwanda's Economic Miracle, 7 J. MGMT. & SUSTAINABILITY
88 (2017) (detailing the history of the master-client relationship among the
ethnicities in Rwanda).
29. Maya Goldstein Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in
TransitionalJustice, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 355, 368 (2005).
30. Drumbl, supra note 3, at 1224.
31. Id. at 1222 n.1. Drumbl undertakes an extensive literature review in
order to test the veracity of the number of deaths resulting from the genocide.
He notes that 800,000 killed is the most often-reported number, citing Letter
from Kofi A. Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, to the President of the U.N.
During the 1994 Genocide of Rwanda 3, U.N. Doc S.1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999),
yet the numbers vary somewhat. See DES FORGES, supra note 12, at 16
(assessing the death number as "at least a half-million"); PHILIP GOUREVITCH,
WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR
FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 3 (1998) (noting that "Rwandans often speak
of a million deaths, and they may be right").
32. Drumbl, supra note 3, at 1245-46.
33. Id. at 1246.
34. Id.; see also GOUREVITCH, supra note 31, at 307 (stating that one of the
general assumptions among Hutu was that they were to "kill or be killed").
35. Rwandan Genocide, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/africa/
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Paul Kagame, featured in Sweet Dreams, led the RPF charge in
1994 and has remained in a position of power as a member of the
RPF government ever since. 36 Under the RPF-led government,
eventually headed by Kagame in 2003,37 the government has

adopted a unification policy that refers to Rwandans as "One
Rwanda" in an attempt to eliminate distinctions between Hutu
and Tutsi. 38
Of the many documentaries, books, and first-hand accounts
of the genocide, what is clear is that no one living in Rwanda was
unscathed by the violence that took place in 1994.39 The children
of the genocide are now adults, and reckon with immeasurable
mental and physical scars. Many have parents who remain in
jail. Thus, the critical role of community-building remains a
priority, despite the fact that Rwanda has experienced relative
peace since 1994.

rwandan-genocide (last updated Oct. 1, 2018).
36. See generally COLIN M. WAUGH, PAUL KAGAME AND RWANDA: POWER,
GENOCIDE AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (2004). Kagame was the head
of the RPF when it was able to recapture Rwanda and put an end to the
genocide. After that point, he served as Vice President and Minister of Defense
from 1994 until 2000, under President Pasteur Bizimungu. However, many
Rwandans assumed that Kagama was the de facto leader of the country.
Kagame was selected by government ministers to lead the country when
Bizimungu resigned in 2000. In 2003, Kagame was elected via national election
after the passage of the Rwandan constitution. Helen C. Epstein, America's
Secret Role in the Rwandan Genocide, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2017, 1:00 EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/sep/12/americas-secret-role-in-therwandan- genocide.
37. WAUGH, supra note 36, at 149.
38. See, e.g., id. at 160-63.
39. One of the most impressive documentaries about Rwanda and its
potential for success is found in the documentary Sweet Dreams, which provides
a sweeping view into the lives of women in post-genocide Rwanda as they
navigate their roles in both business and culture. The women depicted have
already broken cultural barriers by forming the first Rwandan, all-women drum
troupe, comprised of women from all ethnicities. The members of the drum
troupe then embark on an entrepreneurial experiment: to open the first ice
cream shop in Rwanda. The film follows the story of the surprisingly steep
learning curve one must master in order to create the perfect twist of soft service
ice cream. But the twists (or lack thereof) represent a poignant metaphor for
the struggle and determination of female entrepreneurs in Rwanda. It is a story
of women breaking norms, taking risks previously unimaginable, and enduring
countless setbacks and obstacles. SWEET DREAMS (Rob Fruchtman & Lisa
Fruchtman 2012).
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II. REESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW: THE ROLES
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND
WOMEN WITHIN RWANDA
In the wake of the genocide, only fifty attorneys and a
handful of judges remained in the country. 40 The international
community recognized the need to establish an institution that
would promote justice and peace within Rwanda. In November
1994, merely a few months after the termination of the genocide,
the United Nations created the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda ("ICTR"), aimed at prosecuting perpetrators of war
crimes during the genocide. 41 Yet to many Rwandans, the ICTR
was woefully inadequate. The glaring inadequacies of the ICTR
to promote local peace and justice resulted in the newfound use
of a local justice forum among communities in Rwanda, called
gacaca. This Part details the creation of the ICTR, the failings of
the international tribunal, and the re-emergence of the local
system of justice, gacaca, among Rwandans to restore a sense of
trust within communities.
A. POST-GENOCIDE INSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: ICTR
1. Establishment of the ICTR
On November 8, 1994, the UN Security Council passed
Security Council Resolution 955 under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, thereby creating the ICTR.42 Resolution 955 explicitly
stated that the ICTR was created for the "sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for the genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law." 43 The

ICTR was established to send a message that the international
community would not tolerate such atrocious human rights
violations, 44 and to "contribute to the process of national
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of

40. Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca
Courts in Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355, 368 (2002).
41. S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Jason Strain & Elizabeth Keyes, Accountability in the
Aftermath of Rwanda's Genocide, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 87, 98-99 (Jane E. Stromseth ed.,
2003).
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peace." 45

Much has been written about the international judicial
response to mass atrocity, particularly since the Nuremberg
Trials

after World War 11.46 The ICTR was, similarly, an

international criminal tribunal, but was different in that it was
considered an international-national, or hybrid, tribunal. The
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY") was
established in 1993 and is often considered the "sister" tribunal
to the ICTR as the other hybrid tribunal. 47
The Rwandan government passed the Organic Law of 1996
("Organic Law") in order to organize perpetrators into various
categories. 48 Given that the ICTR was a hybrid tribunal, the
perpetrators tried by the ICTR were Rwandans that fell under
Category 1 offenders, as determined by the Organic Law. The
Organic Law defined "genocide" and "crimes against humanity"
in accordance with international treaties that Rwanda ratified. 49
The Organic Law organized individuals into four categories.
Category 1 suspects were those who: a) planned, organized,
incited, supervised acts during the genocide; b) were leaders
(national, local, religious, etc.) that committed or encouraged
others to commit crimes of genocide; c) were "notorious
murderers" as defined by the zeal in his or her killings or
45.

S.C. Res. 955, supranote 41, at 2.

46. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS:
FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 1 (1998); CARLOS

SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL, at vii (1996) (reflecting a theoretical
and moral debate about the use of punishment against what is often deemed
the Kantian "radical evil"); Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards
Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International
HumanitarianLaw, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2 (1998); Drumbl, supra note 3, at 122829; Goldstein Bolocan, supra note 29, at 357.
47. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 31, at 252 (noting that at least one
Rwandan government official claimed that the U.N. simply replaced every
instance of "Yugoslavia" with "Rwanda" in creating the ICTR); Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia, About the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/en/about (last
visited Apr. 7, 2019).
48. ORGANIC LAW No. 08/1996 OF 1996 ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE OR
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED SINCE 1 OCTOBER 1990, OFFICIAL

GAZETTE No. 17 OF 1/9/1996 (Rwanda).
49. Id. art. 1; see also G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity (Nov. 11, 1970), acceded to by Rwanda, Apr. 16, 1975; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, succeeded to by Rwanda, Mar. 21,
1964; International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, acceded to by Rwanda, Apr. 16, 1975.

376

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW

[Vol. 28:2

"excessive wickedness" in which the killings were carried out; or
d) were any person committing acts of sexual torture.50 Category
2 crimes included those whose "acts of criminal participation
place them among the perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices
of intentional homicide or of serious assault against the person,
causing death."5 1 Category 3 was comprised of persons
committing "serious assaults," and Category 4 consisted of those
who committed offenses against property. 52
The ICTR had jurisdiction only over criminals whose acts
constituted Category 1 crimes. Given the number of
perpetrators, jurisdiction over Category 1 crimes was split
between the ICTR and national courts, with an "unofficial
division," which directed that the ICTR was to hear the cases of
"suspects considered among the most important planners and
perpetrators of the genocide." 53 Rwanda would adjudicate crimes
of lesser categories.
The ICTR was the first international criminal court to issue
a verdict based upon charges related to genocide. 54 In total, 93
individuals were indicted by the ICTR.66 Of those, 62 received
sentences; 14 were acquitted; 10 were referred to national
jurisdictions for trial; 3 remained fugitives; 2 died prior to
judgment; and 2 indictments were withdrawn prior to trial.5 6
The Tribunal was officially closed on December 31, 2015,
possibly due to the establishment of the International Criminal
Court.5 7
2. The ICTR and Women's Rights
As noted above in the classifications of Category 1 crimes,
50. ORGANIC LAW No. 08/1996 OF 1996, supra note 48, art. 2.
51. Id.
52. Id. Eventually, Categories 2 and 3 were combined under the
modifications to the Gacaca Law of 2001, detailed in Section I.B, infra.
53. Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and TraditionalJustice: The Case of the
Gacaca Courts in Post-GenocideRwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 765, 791
(2007).
54. Goldstein Bolocan, supra note 29, at 370.
55. U.N. Int'l Residual Mechanism for Crim. Tribunals, The ICTR in Brief,
http://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
56. Id.
57. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002); Rwanda: InternationalTribunal
Closing Its Doors, HUm. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 23, 2015, 2:50 AM EST),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/23/rwanda-international-tribunal-closingits-doors.
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rape was included among the "most serious" of crimes.5 8 This
was a major victory for advocates of women's rights because the
ICTR was the first international war crimes tribunal to consider
rape as an act offensive enough that was considered a Category
1 genocide crime. 59 The categorization was also important
because of the rampant use of rape as a tool of the genocide.60 It
was estimated that as many as 500,000 women were raped
during the genocide. 61 This is significant because, as detailed in
Section III, women made up nearly seventy percent of the
population after the genocide, and the vast majority of survivors
had to struggle not only with the psychological pain of living
through the genocide, but also the pain of experiencing horrific
sexual violence. 62
3. Rwandan Opposition to the ICTR
Although Rwanda initially requested the establishment of
an international tribunal, 63 it quickly withdrew its support for
the creation of the ICTR. Rwanda had the opportunity to
participate in the Security Council's deliberations on the
creation of the ICTR. 64 Representing a major stain against the
Tribunal, Rwanda was the sole dissenting vote in the creation of
the ICTR. 65

58. ORGANIC LAW No. 08/1996 OF 1996 ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE OR
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED SINCE 1 OCTOBER 1990, OFFICIAL
GAZETTE No. 17 OF 1/9/1996 (Rwanda).

59. Brittany A. Olwine, Note, One Step Forward, But Two Steps Back: Why
Gacaca In Rwanda is Jeopardizing the Good Effect of Akayesu on Women's
Rights, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 639, 640 (2011) (noting that genocidal
rape was first recognized in international humanitarian law by the ICTR in
1998); see also Stephanie K. Wood, A Woman Scorned for the Least Condemned
War Crime: Precedent and Problems with ProsecutingRape as a Serious War
Crime in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 274, 275 (2004).
60. Emily Amick, Trying International Crimes on Local Lawns: The
Adjudication of Genocide Sexual Violence in Rwanda's Gacaca Courts, 20
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 14-15 (2011).
61. Id. at 7.
62. Id. at 10, 18.
63. VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE
BALKANS: VIRTUAL TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 159
(2008).

64.
1994).
65.

U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8,
Id. at 2.
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The Rwandan delegation to the UN opposed the creation of
the ICTR for three major reasons. First, Rwanda opposed the
lack of the death penalty for the worst offenders, who were to be
adjudicated in the Tribunal, when lower-level offenders would
be subject to the death penalty under Rwandan law.66 During
deliberations at the UN, the Rwandan representative was
emphatic that the lack of capital punishment for the worst
offenders-the ones who planned and organized the genocidewas "not conducive to national reconciliation in Rwanda."6 7
Because it was assumed that the most culpable offenders were
to be tried at the ICTR, seemingly "less-culpable" but still
Category 1 offenders then were to be tried by the national
Rwandan courts. 68 A conviction in the Rwandan courts of a
Category 1 crime carried a capital sentence, whereas the ICTR
did not have the death penalty as an option for sentencing. This
greatly troubled Rwandans seeking retributive justice after the
genocide. 69
Second, Rwanda opposed the temporal and geographical
jurisdiction restrictions on the ICTR, which limited it to acts
occurring within Rwanda during the 1994 calendar year,
thereby excluding from jurisdiction any genocidal planning
efforts occurring outside of Rwanda or prior to 1994.70 In
addition, with the ICTR's temporal jurisdiction reaching into
December 1994, the ICTR had jurisdiction over post-genocide
killings of Hutu genocidaires at the hands of the RPF soldiers.7 1
Prosecuting RPF soldiers was in line with international
humanitarian goals, but was an affront to the efforts of
Rwandans to move forward under the new regime headed by
those aligned with the RPF and Kagame.
Finally, Rwanda opposed the tribunal because it was sited
outside of Rwanda. 72 This was a major obstacle toward a sense
of justice within the Rwandan borders. Given that the genocide

66.
67.

Id. at 15.
Id.

68. See ORGANIC LAW NO. 08/1996 OF 1996 ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE OR
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED SINCE 1 OCTOBER 1990, OFFICIAL

GAZETTE NO. 17 OF 1/9/1996 (Rwanda).
69. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., supranote 64, at 15.
70. Irene C. Lu, Note, Curtain Call at Closing: The Multi-Dimensional
Legacy of the InternationalCriminalTribunalfor Rwanda, 34 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
859, 867-68 (2013).
71. PESKIN, supra note 63, at 162.
72. Lu, supra note 70, at 868-69.
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was so personal to so many, justice was demanded both at home,
in a literal sense, and on personal and community levels, rather
than simply a national level. In other words, the ICTR did not
represent local justice, though it may be argued that it was never
intended to do so. The ICTR was an international response, and
represented the efforts and interests of the international
community. The creation of ICTR was a historic achievement in
many ways, but it fell short of instilling a sense of local justice
among Rwandans.
B. GACACA
Where the ICTR fell short, Rwanda needed other ways to
ensure justice, accountability, and healing. Rwanda had an
established national justice system and courts, but many of the
buildings were destroyed and those involved in the system were
killed during the genocide.7 3 Therefore, the justice system was
quickly overrun with genocidaire suspects, leaving communities
to figure out on their own how to live amoun each other again.
Rwandans, therefore, turned to a historical method of conflict
resolution, in the form of gacaca.
Gacaca is a Kinyarwandan 74 word meaning "lawn" or
"grass." 75 It represents a gathering of members of the community
on a lawn or grassy square in the center of town. Its purpose is
to handle conflict among citizens. It has a long history within
Rwanda, and gained an elevated status after the genocide, as
this Section explores.
1. Pre-Genocide Use of Gacaca
Although there has not been much written about gacaca
before Belgian rule in 1919, there is evidence of gacaca existing
in the early twentieth century as an informal method of conflict
resolution among Rwandans.76 The gacaca hearings at that time
typically involved disputes over livestock or property.77 In other
73. See id. at 872.
74. CIA, supranote 8.
75. Q&A: Justice in Rwanda, BBC NEWS (June 18, 2002, 10:31 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/2051526.stm.
76. Filip Reyntjens, Le gacaca ou la justice du gazon au Rwanda, 40
POLITIQUE AFRICAINE 31, 32 (1990).
77. See Goldstein Bolocan, supra note 29, at 377. While most disputes were
civil in nature, as opposed to criminal, there were some instances wherein a
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words, gacaca was an indigenous judicial forum used to resolve
minor disputes within rural communities.78 Male heads of
household participated while women were excluded entirely
from participating. 79 The aim of gacaca was to engender
reconciliation among neighbors rather than retribution or
punishment, and that aim became very important and notable
when gacaca was used for more complex controversies later.80
In the early twentieth century, gacaca was gradually used
to handle more complex issues within communities and its
importance within Rwandan society increased.8 1 In 1943, it was
officially recognized by the Belgian administration as a
legitimate judicial system that operated concurrent with the
national judicial system. 82 At that time, gacaca judges, typically
Tutsi, were politically appointed. 83 This meant that the previous
iteration of gacaca, which was very informal and consisted of
male elders presiding over conflicts, had given way to a slightly
more formal concept whereby elected officials could call parties
to a gacaca hearing. 84 Community participation was encouraged
but was still limited to men. 85
In general, as compared to the national courts, gacaca in the
pre-genocide era remained a more informal, local level of conflict
resolution aimed at restoring individuals and integrating them
into the (often, rural) community. This changed somewhat after
minor criminal offense would be handled via gacaca, with the result being some
sort of civil settlement rather than a criminal sanction.
78. Id. at 376.
79. Id. Unless a woman was a party to the conflict, there was no female
participation allowed.
80. Id. Goldstein Bolocan emphasizes that "[g]acaca embodies restorative
justice principles because it does not seek to achieve justice by punishing the
perpetrator, but to restore social order by finding communal, compromised
solutions, and by reintegrating the offender within the community"; see also
Clark, supra note 53, at 778-79 (noting that despite the goals of restorative
justice, there often were cases wherein retribution was demanded, often "with
the process culminating in sharing beer, wine or food usually provided by the
guilty party to symbolize reconciliation of the parties").
81. See Clark, supra note 53, at 779.
82. Id. Gacaca and the national court system began to develop different
types of plaintiffs. Citing Reyntjens, Clark notes that rural claimants typically
sought out gacaca to handle disputes and conflicts, whereas more urban
dwellers used the national courts, often because the cases were more complex.
Reyntjens cites that from 1986 to 1987, in the more rural area of Butare, almost
ninety-three percent of the cases were heard by gacaca courts rather than the
more formal national courts. Reyntjens, supra note 76, at 38.
83. Clark, supra note 53, at 779.
84. Id. at 780.
85. Id. at 779.
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the genocide, as detailed below.
2. Post-Genocide Use of Gacaca
In the months after the genocide, there were approximately
125,000 genocide suspects arrested and held in jails meant to
hold only 15,000 inmates. 86 The cost of housing 120,000 inmates
ran up to $20 million USD.8 7 Rwanda received international aid
to defray those costs, but it was clear that this cost was
unsustainable, and that Rwanda had to establish a method to
process the inmates within the country.8 8 After the Organic Law
passed in 1996, suspects were organized according to category of
crime. 89 Category 1 criminals were referred to the ICTR as well
as the national courts. 90 Rwanda had to figure out how to process
the majority of criminals, ranging from Category 2 to Category
4.
According to then Vice President Paul Kagame, the gacaca
system represented "the only way forward." 91 Using gacaca as
an option for handling genocide suspects was not immediately
welcomed by the Rwandan government. 92 Instead, the Rwandan
government first focused on setting up a robust national court
system with help from international lawyers and nongovernmental organizations. 93 However, many provincial
prefects in the Rwandan government continually encouraged the
94
use gacaca.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Drumbl, supra note 3, at 1286.
See Clark, supra note 53, at 776.
See Wierzynska, supra note 2, at 1955.
ORGANIC LAW No. 08/1996 OF 1996 ON THE ORGANIZATION

OF

PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE OR
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED SINCE 1 OCTOBER 1990, OFFICIAL

GAZETTE No. 17 OF 1/9/1996 (Rwanda).
90. See Section II.A., supra, and accompanying notes.
91. Goldstein Bolocan, supra note 29, at 355.
92. Id.; see also Clark, supra note 53, at 780-81. Clark details that at an
international conference in Kigali in 1995, the government debated having an
amnesty program for genocide suspects, as well as perhaps using gacaca. The
amnesty program was rejected out of fear that genocide victims and survivors
may exact vigilante justice. The government also rejected using gacaca at that
time because the use of gacaca would go against Rwandan law requiring formal
process for serious crimes including murder. Also considered was a truth and
reconciliation model used in South Africa. This was also rejected for lack of
appropriate punishment for those involved in the genocide.
93. Clark, supra note 53, at 782.
94. Id. at 782-83. According to Clark, the "most notable among the
[prefects] was Protais Musoni, then Prefect of Kibungo ... who was described
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In February 1999, after an intensive study of gacaca and
debate that include the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, the UN Special Rapporteur declared that gacaca
would be useful for "purposes of testifying in connection with
reconciliation" but that it would not be "competent to hear
crimes

against

humanity." 95

Nevertheless,

despite

the

limitations of gacaca that the UN described, then President
Pasteur Bizimungu ordered the National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission ("NURC") to undertake a national
analysis of popular support for the use of gacaca. 96 The result of
the NURC study was the proposal and creation of the Gacaca
Law.97

The Gacaca Law gave jurisdiction to gacaca courts over
Category 2-4 offenses, though the offense categories were
changed after 2004 to combine Categories 2 and 3.98 This meant
that gacacacourts heard crimes of murder, assault, and property
offenses. Under the Gacaca Law and its subsequent
modifications, gacaca morphed into a more formal system,
inclusive of sentencing guidelines. 99 Gacaca jurisdictions were
separated into cellules and could be appealed to a larger
appellate level.10 0 Sentences usually included both prison time

as the 'father of gacaca.'
95. Michel Moussalli (Special Representative), Report on the Situation of

Human Rights in Rwanda, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/33 (Feb. 8, 1999).
96. NAT'L
UNITY
AND
RECONCILIATION
COMM'N,
NATION-WIDE
GRASSROOTS
CONSULTATIONS
REPORT:
UNITY
AND
RECONCILIATION
INITIATIVES IN RWANDA 3 (2001).
97. See, e.g., LAW NO. 25/2012 OF 15/06/2012 TERMINATING THE NATIONAL
SERVICE IN CHARGE OF FOLLOW-UP, SUPERVISION AND COORDINATION OF THE
ACTIVITIES OF GACACA JURISDICTIONS, OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. SPECIAL OF
15/06/2012 (Rwanda); ORGANIC LAW NO. 16/2004 OF 19/6/2004 ESTABLISHING
THE ORGANIZATION, COMPETENCE AND FUNCTIONING OF GACACA COURTS
CHARGED WITH PROSECUTING AND TRYING THE PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME
OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, COMMITTED BETWEEN 1
OCTOBER 1993 AND 31 DECEMBER 1994, OFFICIAL GAZETTE YEAR 43, No.
SPECIAL OF 19/6/2004 (Rwanda); ORGANIC LAW NO. 40/2000 OF 26/1/2001
SETTING UP GACACA JURISDICTIONS AND ORGANIZING PROSECUTIONS FOR
OFFENCES CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE OR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY COMMITTED BETWEEN 1 OCTOBER 1993 AND 31 DECEMBER 1994, art.

13 (Rwanda).
98. Clark, supra note 53, at 789-90 (explaining that the Gacaca Law has
been modified a number of times since its original passage, and that the most

important modification occurred in 2004, when the law combined Categories 2
and 3 into a single Category 2 crime).
99. Id. at 794.
100. Allison Corey & Sandra F. Joireman, Retributive Justice: The Gacaca
Courts in Rwanda, 103(410) AFR. AFF. 73, 83 n.29 (2004).
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and community service. 10 1 Gacaca judges were able to summon
witnesses, issue search warrants, and impose punishments
according to the sentencing guidelines. One interesting feature
of gacaca sentences was that suspects could reduce their
sentences if they admitted guilt. 102

On balance however, gacaca, while modified greatly in its
formalized version, retained many of its important defining
characteristics. As Clark explains, the "spirit of gacaca
emphasizes that the community should play a central role in all
aspects of the process and that the objectives of gacaca should
not be pursued through the agency of national or local elites but
through communal engagement in a public setting." 103
Therefore, the nine 104 judges or inyangamugayo who make up
each court are not trained lawyers or judges, but respected
individuals elected by the community. 105
On every gacaca court, women have been elected as judges,
which is a marked improvement from the pre-genocide situation
in which women were not allowed to serve as judges, or
participate at all, in many cases. 106 Additionally, gacaca courts
which are led by women have been proven more effective than
those lead by men. 107
Furthermore, gacacaremains a process that focuses on both
individual and community rehabilitation and restoration. For
example, in post-genocide Rwanda, entire villages attend gacaca
trials. 108 This public process helps "bring the facts of the
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Clark, supra note 53, at 800.
104. Sarel Kandell Kromer, The Rwandan Reconciliation, WASH. POST (Oct.
16, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/15/
AR2005101500108.html.
105. Clark, supra note 53, at 786.
106. JOHN MUTAMBA & JEANNE IZABILIZA, THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN
RECONCILIATION AND PEACE BUILDING IN RWANDA: TEN YEARS AFTER

GENOCIDE 1994-2004 12 (2005), http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
documents/un/unpanO31033.pdf. East African Community Secretariat, Gender
and Community Development Analysis in Rwanda 32 (2009), http://cleancook
stoves.org/resources-files/gender-and-community.pdf.
107. Id. at 32.
108. See, e.g., Jacqueline Lewis, Mass Graves and a Thousand Hills:
University Student Perspectiveson the Gacaca Courtsin Post-GenocideRwanda,
10 INQUIRY J., Spring 2010 (providing student perspectives on gacaca courts
used in post-genocide Rwanda); Rwanda's Grass Courts, N.Y. TIMES (July 10,
2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/10/opinion/rwanda-s-grass-courts.
html (indicating that gacaca courts have been used for hundreds of entire
villages in post-genocide Rwanda).
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genocide into the open," thereby offering victims the closure
necessary to recover. 109 "The reparative function of gacaca's
'truth-telling' should not be underestimated." 10 As Ambassador
Swannee Hunt summarized in 2014, "By 2012, nearly two
million people had been before these courts, often assembled
under a shade tree; that transitional justice process has been key
to stabilizing Rwandan society."111
One theme of this Article is that the judicial
entrepreneurship evidenced by gacaca instilled a pervasive
entrepreneurship mindset within Rwanda, and the women of
Rwanda in particular. The goals of collective decision-making
and the focus on local community-building bled into business
decisions and formation, as detailed below.
III.

MAKING WAY FOR FEMALE ENTREPRENEURS:
CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT TO EMPOWER
WOMEN IN RWANDA

"Necessity is the mother of all invention" is a well-worn
adage that accurately reflects the Rwandan experience. From
the macro perspective, peace in Rwanda "is not a matter of choice
but of survival." 112 Necessity brought on by the near obliteration
of a generation, an ethnic group, and law and order has driven
intense creativity, as exemplified by the evolved and novel use
of gacaca courts. 113 "The unifying experience of truth-telling and
holding perpetrators to account through an interactive sociolegal
process of justice helped to compel cohabitation and non-violent

109. Cori Wielenga & Geoff Harris, Building Peace and Security after
Genocide: The Contributionof the Gacaca Courts of Rwanda, 20 AFR. SECURITY
REV. 15, 23 (2011); see also Charlotte Clapham, Gacaca: A Successful
Experiment in Restorative Justice? (July 30, 2012) (unpublished essay,
University of Sheffield) (on file with E-International Relations Students),
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/30/gacaca-a-successful-experiment-in-restorativejustice-2/ (citing Wielenga & Harris, supranote 109, and providing more detail).
110. Clapham, supra note 109.
111. Swanee Hunt, The Rise of Rwanda's Women: Rebuilding and Reuniting
a Nation, FOREIGN AFF. (June 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
rwanda/2014-03-30/rise-rwandas-women.
112. MUTAMBA & IZABILIZA, supra note 106, at 12.
113. Though this Article elides the positives, Rwanda, especially its
leadership under President Kagame, still has serious issues, especially those
related to freedom of speech, political pluralism, and extrajudicial killings of
petty criminals. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2018: EVENTS OF

2017, Rwanda, 453-59 (2018), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world
report-download/201801world report-web.pdf.
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coexistence."114

Furthermore, Rwanda is one of the first countries to
aggressively change its laws in order to increase gender parity
in major national institutions. For example, half of the country's
highest court is comprised of women, which supports the claim
that women have helped reestablish the rule of law. 115
As explained by Kagame in 1999:
It is imperative to our lawmakers, policy makers and
implementers to have an objective and correct analysis
of the gender question in order to design corrective
policies and programs. The question of gender equality
in our society needs a clear and critical evaluation in
order to come up with concrete strategies to map the
future development in which men and women are true
partners and beneficiaries. My understanding of gender
is that it is an issue of good governance, good economic
management and respect of human rights. 116

The following Part details how, by necessity, women
challenged traditional gender roles and improved their legal
status after the genocide. This Part also explores how a more
equitable legal regime has contributed to economic development,
which in turn has had profound impacts on peace-building.
A. WOMEN AND THE RWANDAN CONSTITUTION
Prior to the genocide, Rwandan law greatly restricted the
legal and economic agency of women. 117 Traditionally, women's
roles were limited to those of wife and mother, 118 and in essence,

&

114. Janet McKnight, The Anatomy of Mass Accountability: Confronting
Ideology and Legitimacy in Rwanda's Gacaca Courts, 1 CONFLICT TRENDS 35,
41 (2014).
115. Hunt, supra note 111. Rwanda ranks tenth in the world for the number
of women in its constitutional court. World Bank, Women, Business and the Law
(2016), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/810421519921949813/WomenBusines
s-and-the-Law-2016.pdf.
116. MUTAMBA & IZABILIZA, supra note 106, at 9.
117. See Jennie E. Burnet, Women Have Found Respect: Gender Quotas,
Symbolic Representation, and Female Empowerment in Rwanda, 7 POL.
GENDER 303 (2011).
118. BINAIFER NOWROJEE, SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING
THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH (1996), https://www.hrw.org/
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women had the legal status of minors. 119 Women were not
allowed to work, 120 access credit, 121 or enter into contracts
without their husband's permission. 122 They were not allowed
assert their legal rights, if any, in court. 123 And they were
silenced when it came to political participation.
During the genocide, women had to step into traditional
male roles in order to produce income for their families and
manage the household. However, many women were stripped of
their power as "[t]hey endured systematic rape and torture,
witnessed unspeakable cruelty, and lost livelihoods and
property."1 24 As a result, women survivors in particular had deep
and profound emotional and physical scars that reinforced
patriarchal norms. 125
After the genocide and the death, escape, or incarceration of
countless men, women made up roughly 60-70 percent of the
Rwandan population. 126 They were thus presented with a wide

sites/default/files/reports/1996_Rwanda_%20Shattered%2OLives.pdf
("Within
Rwandan society, women have traditionally been regarded and treated as
dependents of their male relatives. Throughout their lives, women are expected
to be managed and protected by their fathers, their husbands and their male

children.").

.

119. See Lisa A. Doan, Rwandan Women and the 1994 Genocide: The Effect
on their Social and Political Roles 4 (Nov. 15, 2010) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
Georgetown University) (on file with Georgetown Libraries), https://repository.
library.georgetown.edulbitstream/handle/10822/558113/Doan-georgetown_007
6M_10933.pdf (noting that a Rwandan woman's role was defined by her male
relatives, so she was "similar to a child in the eyes of society"); id. at 10 (stating
that "[m]arried Rwandan women were treated as dependents, like children.").
120. NOWROJEE, supra note 118 (noting that under Article 213 of the 1988
Family Code, a woman was not allowed to engage in commercial activity or
employment without authorization from her husband).
121. Id. ("nor were [women] eligible for credit or loans. Women were often
required to obtain their husband's authorization in order to qualify for credit.").
122. Doan, supra note 119, at 10 ("Married women had the legal right to vote
but needed their husbands' permission to participate in business or any legal
court actions. Women could have their own bank accounts but their husbands
could withdraw money without their permission. Men could even deny their
wives access to their own bank accounts.").
123. NOWROJEE, supra note 118 (noting that under the Civil Code, a woman
must obtain her husband's authorization for any legal matter in which she must
appear).
124. Elizabeth Powley, Rwanda: The Impact of Women Legislators on Policy
Outcomes Affecting Children and Families2 (UNICEF, Background Paper, Dec.
2006), https://www.unicef.org/policyanalysis/files/Rwandatheimpact of wom
en legislators.pdf
125. Id.
126. Gregory Warner, It's the No. 1 Country For Women In Politics But Not
in Daily Life, NPR: GOATS & SODA (July 29, 2016), https://www.npr.org/
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variety of challenges ranging from caring for the country's
500,000 orphans, to addressing the wounds of trauma, to
rebuilding decimated communities, and to supporting their
families economically. 127 Many women took on the roles of heads
of households and filled leadership positions at all levels of
government. 128 As stated by humanitarian Elizabeth Powley,
"[t]he genocide forced women to think of themselves differently
and in many cases develop skills they would not otherwise have
acquired." 12 9
The genocide allowed women to transform the legal
landscape, and their rights, within Rwanda. This arc of progress
was helped, in part, by President Kagame, although his
motivations for doing so remain subject to much debate. 130 While
his and the RPF's motives have been questioned, the Kagameled government pushed for gender equality. 131 The first major
move, in this regard, came from the drafting of the new Rwandan
constitution in 2003.132

The constitution included a robust equal protection
clause. 133 More surprisingly, it also contained a controversial
quota that required that women make up at least thirty percent

sections/goatsandsoda/2016/07/29/487360094/invisibilia-no-one-thought-thisall-womans-debate-team-could-crush-it.
127. Powley, supra note 124, at 2.
128. Burnet, supranote 117, at 311.
129. Powley, supra note 124, at 3.
130. See Ari Berman, Dictatorin Disguise, HARV. POL. REV. (Apr. 22, 2016),
http://harvardpolitics.com/world/your-friendly-neighborhood-dictator/.
131. Several scholars argue that the RPF's women-friendly policies are
merely a political tactic to retain power and promote a positive image
internationally. Jennie E. Burnet, Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women
in Governance in Post-GenocideRwanda, 107(428) AFR. AFF. 361 (2008); Filip
Reyntjens, Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the
World: Governance in Post-GenocideRwanda, 110(438) AFR. AFF. 1 (2010); see
also Alexandra Topping, Rwanda's Women Make Strides Towards Equality 20
Years After the Genocide, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2014, 5:13 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/07/rwanda-women-empoweredimpoverished ("Behind closed doors, fearful critics of President Paul Kagame's
regime claim the apparent empowerment of women is little more than a PR
exercise.").
132. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, June 4, 2003, with
Amendments Through Dec. 12, 2015.
133. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, June 4, 2003,
Amendment No. 3 of 13/8/2008, pmbl. ¶ 10 ("We, the People of Rwanda, ...
COMMITTED to building a State governed by the rule of law, based on the
respect for human rights, freedom and on the principle of equality of all
Rwandans before the law as well as equality between men and women").
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of all public decision-making bodies. 134 Women have consistently
exceeded these quota requirements. 135 For example, in 2013,
sixty-four percent of Rwanda's Parliament was comprised of
women-the highest percentage in the world. 136
Women have seized opportunities to lead and represent
themselves at both the national and local levels of
government. 137 As a result, they have been less reticent to speak
in public, assert their rights, and pursue traditionally maledominated roles. 138 As an ethnographic study by Professor
Jennie Burnet shows, gender quotas embedded into the
Rwandan constitution have "increased respect from family and
community members, enhanced capacity to speak and be heard
in public forums, greater autonomy in decision making in the
family, and increased access to education." 139
B. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS EMPOWERING WOMEN

The foundation supporting women's empowerment was also
established by Rwanda's Vision 2020 development program and
its offspring, the National Gender Policy. President Kagame
launched Vision 2020 in 2000. Its main objectives involved
transforming the country into a knowledge-based, middleincome country, thereby unifying the Rwandan people, reducing
poverty, and improving health outcomes. 140 The National

134.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, June 4,

2003, with

Amendments Through Dec. 12, 2015, art. 10 ("The State of Rwanda commits
itself to upholding the following fundamental principles and ensuring their
respect: ...
4. building a State governed by the rule of law, a pluralistic
democratic Government, equality of all Rwandans and between men and
women which is affirmed by women occupying at least thirty percent (30%) of
positions in decision-making organs.").
135. See Powley, supranote 124, at 9.
136. Press Center, U.N. Rwanda, Women Secure 64 Per Cent of Seats in
Rwandan Parliamentary Elections (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.rw.one.un.org/pre
ss-center/news/women-secure-64-cent-seats-rwandan-parliamentary-elections.
137. INCLUSIVE SECURITY, supra note 1; Burnet, supra note 117, at 303.
138. This is true even in rural communities. As stated by Burnet, "[t]he large
number of women in local government, coupled with the clear endorsement of
women as political authorities by President Kagame, the RPF, and the central
government, sent a clear message to rural citizens that women must be accepted
as legitimate political agents or local government authorities." Burnet, supra
note 117, at 318.
139. Id. at 303.
140.

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, MINISTRY OF FIN. & ECON. PLAN., RWANDA

VISION 2020 (July 2000), https://www.sida.se/globalassets/global/countries-andregions/africa/rwanda/d402331a.pdf; see Sam Rugege, Women and Poverty in
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Gender Policy was first adopted in 2004 and revised in 2010.141
Generally, it gives guidance to the government to help it
"integrate" gender issues into policies and programs. Specific
policies include economic empowerment, health, and access to
basic needs such as water and sanitation. 142 Its mission is to
"contribute to the elimination of gender inequalities in all
sectors of national life, in order to achieve the nation's goal for
sustainable development." 143

At the center of the women's political movement is the
Forum of Women Parliamentarians, most commonly known by
its French acronym FFRP. FFRP is a bipartisan coalition of
female lawmakers. 144 Their work is focused on "review[ing]
existing laws and introduc[ing] amendments to change
discriminatory statutes."145 The FFRP also helps train women's
groups and and advise them on relevant legal issues. 146
As a result of FFRP, the National Gender Policy, and
women's activism, many laws improving women's access to
economic opportunities and freedom from violence have been
passed. 147 As of 2017, Rwanda was ranked fourth in the world
Rwanda The Respective Roles of Courts and Policy 13 (Oxford Hum. Rts. Hub,
Working Paper No. 1, Jan. 2015), https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/OxHRH-Working-Paper-Number-1-Rugegel.pdf
("Vision 2020 is a long-term development framework that highlights Rwanda's
development goals between 2000 to 2020. As Rwanda's development road map,
it promotes gender equality as a cross-cutting theme and a pillar of
development. Under Section 5.1, Vision 2020 recognises [sic] that women have
less access to opportunities than men and are poorly represented in decision
making, despite women representing the majority of Rwanda's population and
contributing more than men to agricultural production." (citations omitted)).
141. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA MINISTRY OF GENDER & FAMILY PROMOTION,
NATIONAL GENDER POLICY (2010), http://menengage.org/resources/rwandagender-policy/.
142. Id. at 7.
143. Id. at 19.
144. Powley, supra note 124, at 5.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See LAW NO. 22/99 OF 12/11/1999 TO SUPPLEMENT BOOK I OF THE CIVIL
CODE AND TO INSTITUTE PART FIVE REGARDING MATRIMONIAL REGIMES,
LIBERALITIES AND SUCCESSIONS, OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 22 OF 15/11/1999, art.

87 (Rwanda) (establishing Rwandan women's right to inherit); Charles
Ntampaka, Family Law in Rwanda, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY
LAW 1995, 415, 423 (Andrew Bainham ed., 1997) (discussing the establishment
of Rwandan women's right to own bank accounts and participate in lawsuits);
Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada, Rwanda: Domestic Violence,
Including Legislation, State Protection, Services and Legal Recourse Available
to Victims (2011-September 2013), REFWORLD (Oct. 18, 2013), http://
www.refworld.org/docid/527b55984.html (discussing a Rwandan law increasing
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for the size of its gender gap according to the World Economic
Forum. 148 Its outstanding rank was due in large part to the high
female labor force participation (sixty-seven percent) and
political representation.

149

Starting with one of the highest priorities, the fundamental
need for safety has been partially addressed by increasing the
punishments for rape and by making spousal abuse and other
forms of gender-based violence illegal.15 0 Multiple governmental
agencies have also been formed to advance the interests of
women and prevent sexual violence. 15 1 Thus, while women are
still victims of sexual assault, particularly inside their intimate
relationships, the rates of sexual violence have decreased in the
country.152

Beyond safety, economic opportunities have been
improved for Rwandan women through changes in law. Women

punishments for rape and making gender-based violence illegal).
148.

WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT 2017, at 284

(2017), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFGGGR_2017.pdf.
149. Id.
150. Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada, supra note 147.
151. These include "Ministry for Gender and Family Promotion
(MIGEPROF), the National Gender cluster, the National Women's Council, and
the establishment of Gender Desks within the Ministry of Defense and the
National Police." USAID, GENDER ANALYSIS FOR USAID/RWANDA VALUING
OPEN AND INCLUSIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT PROJECT JANUARY 2015 (2015),

https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/GA%20-%20VOICE%
20project%20-%20FINAL%20Jan%2021%202015%20-%2OPublic%2oVersion%
20%281%29.pdf.
152. Burnet, supra note 117, at 320; see NAT'L INST. OF STATISTICS OF
RWANDA, RWANDA DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY 2014-15, at 275 (2016),

https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdflFR316/FR316.pdf (finding that seventy-eight
percent of women had not experienced sexual violence). There is some contrary
evidence however that after the genocide, "the scarcity of men along with the
deterioration of the quality of potential husbands caused by the genocide
increased intimate partner violence in households that formed after the
genocide." GIULIA LA MATTINA, WHEN ALL THE GOOD MEN ARE GONE: SEX
RATIO AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 4 (2012),

https://www.bu.edu/econ/files/2012/11/dp223.pdf.
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now have the right to inherit, 153 own land, 154 keep their property

separate from their spouses, 155 own bank accounts, 15 6 and
participate

in lawsuits.

15 7

They also have

protection from

gender-based employment discrimination. 15 8 Furthermore, with
increased property rights, women can use collateral to meet
financing requirements, and finance is more accessible through
various governmental programs. 159
In combination with increased legal rights and protections,
the women of Rwanda were further empowered through the

153. LAW No. 22/99 OF 12/11/1999 TO SUPPLEMENT BOOK I OF THE CIVIL
CODE AND TO INSTITUTE PART FIVE REGARDING MATRIMONIAL REGIMES,
LIBERALITIES AND SUCCESSIONS, OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 22 OF 15/11/1999

(Rwanda); see Doan, supranote 119, at 83-84 ("In 1999 the Law on Matrimonial
Regimes, Liberalities, and Successions was approved. The Rwandan
inheritance law, as it was more widely known, is considered to be one of the
most important achievements in gender equality since the genocide. The law
disallowed sex discrimination in land inheritance and division. The historical
significance of this law was the establishment of girls and women as legal heirs
to property.").
154. ORGANIC LAW No. 08/2005 OF 14/07/2005 DETERMINING THE USE AND
MANAGEMENT OF LAND IN RWANDA, art. 4, amended by LAW No. 43/2013 OF

16/06/2013 GOVERNING LAND IN RWANDA, OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. SPECIAL OF
16/6/2013,

ART.

4 (Rwanda);

see JOZEFINA CUTURA,

VOICES OF WOMEN

ENTREPRENEURS IN RWANDA 5 (Oct. 2008), follow link to full report from
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/779801468107961596/Voices-ofwomen-entrepreneurs-in-Rwanda ("Research shows that Rwanda fares better
than its neighboring East African states in the number of women that own land
and property in their own names.").
155. ORGANIC LAW No. 43/2013, supranote 154.
156. Ntampaka, supra note 148, at 423.
157. Id.
158. LAW No. 51/2001 OF 30/12/2001 ESTABLISHING THE LABOUR CODE, art.
12 (Rwanda); ("Every discrimination, exclusion or preference notably based on
race or ethnicity, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, which would result in
destroying or impairing chances' equality as far as employment or profession is
concerned or in not being considered in the same way by tribunals is
prohibited.").
159. E. AFRICAN CMTY. SECRETARIAT, GENDER AND COMMUNITY:
DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS IN RWANDA 14 (2009), http://cleancookstoves.org/
resources files/gender-and-community.pdf ("Mechanisms enabling women at
the grassroots level to have access to credit and savings have been initiated.
Examples include Communal credit funds for women at the grassroots level; the
guarantee funds deposited in Central Bank of Rwanda to provide credit to
medium-scale women entrepreneurs; the setting up of a bank for women with
the support of the Banques Populaires;the putting in place of a Savings and
Credit Cooperative Society due to women's initiative."); see also REPUBLIC OF
RWANDA GENDER MONITORING OFFICE, GENDER AND ACCESS TO FINANCE
(2017), http://www.gmo.gov.rw/fileadmin/user upload/profiles/Gender and Ac
cesstoFinance Booklet GMO March 2017.pdf
(detailing
marked
improvements between 2012 and 2017 for women's access to finance).
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economic realities post-genocide. Before the genocide, forty
percent of the country's GDP was generated solely from
agriculture.16 0 Yet the genocide eviscerated much of the
country's farming infrastructure, as well as its economy. 16 1 In
1994, the Rwandan GDP dropped fifty-eight percent. 162
Factoring in the death toll, two economists estimated that the
Rwandan GDP per survivor decreased by fifty-three percent. 163
And, factoring in the number of surviving Rwandans who left
the country after the genocide, the GDP per remaining
Rwandans dropped an additional thirty-one percent. 164
Reestablishing a vibrant economy after the genocide was a
critical yet daunting task, and one that fell upon survivors,
particularly Rwandan women.
The economic challenges, the changing legal environment
and other concerted efforts among governmental agencies and
women-led civil society organizations have greatly increased the
entrepreneurial activities of women.1 65 Women now head almost
fifty percent of enterprises nationwide and fifty-eight percent in
the informal sector. 166 They also contribute to a large portion of
the Rwandan GDP, which has been growing at a steady rate
since the genocide, and the reduction of poverty, which was
reduced by almost twenty percent from 2000 to 2013.167

Despite the positive changes to the legal environment, "the
160. Luc Bonneux, Rwanda: A Case of Demographic Entrapment, 344
LANCET 1689 (1994). The Rwandan economy is still based primarily on
agriculture production, including coffee and tea, and animal husbandry.
Thomas Kelly, Maintaining Power by Manipulating Memory in Rwanda, 41
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 79, 83 (2017).
161. Philip Gourevitch, The Life After, NEW YORKER (May 4, 2009),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/05/04/the-life-after.
162. Christian Almer & Roland Hodler, The Economic Effects of Political
Violence: Evidence from the Genocide in Rwanda 3, 8 (Univ. of Bath Econ.
Research Papers, No. 37/14, 2015), http://www.bath.ac.uk/economics/research/
working-papers/20 15-papers/economic-effects-political-violence-rwanda.pdf.
163. Id.
164. Id. See also Humerto Lopez & Quentin Wodon, The Economic Impact of
Armed Conflict in Rwanda 14 J. AFR. ECONS. 586 (2005) (estimating that the
Rwandan GDP per capita would be 25 to 30 percent higher in 2005 if the conflict
had not occurred).
165. See CUTURA, supra note 154, at 5.
166. Id. at 9 ("The majority are engaged in the retail sector (eighty-two
percent), with the rest focusing on services (sixteen to seventeen percent) and
manufacturing (one to two percent) sectors.").
167. Employment Rate, Higher For Women Than Men, NAT'L INST. STAT.
RWANDA (2012), http://www.statistics.gov.rw/publication/employment-rate-hig
her-women-men-rwanda (stating that women have a higher employment rate
(85.2%) than men (83.2%)).
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transformative potential of policies on gender equality [is still]
limited by the deep-rooted social norms, gender roles, and
cultural perceptions and practices within which gender
inequalities are embedded." 168 And many reports note that there
is often a gap between the rights granted by the law and the
implementation of those laws. 169 Much work still needs to be
done among community service and governmental organizations
to increase awareness of the new laws. 170
Furthermore, upper and middle-income women are the chief
beneficiaries of increased representation. 17 1 Rural women still
remain at a distinct disadvantage. Women in Rwanda have less
equal representation in management positions (roughly
seventeen percent) and continue to earn less than their male
counterparts. 172 However, it is indisputable that "with the
disruption in gender relations, some women found the freedom
to pursue careers or commercial activities."1 73
IV.

ALIGNING FOR PEACE

There is a great deal of evidence to suggest female
representation supports sustainable peace. 174 Sustainable peace
involves more than a lack of violence. It also encompasses
notions of human rights, equality, and justice. 175 A study by
Professors Mary Caprioli and Mark Boyer, for example, showed
that for every five percent increase in women's representation in
parliament, a state is five times less likely to use violence to
resolve conflict.176 As one Rwandan woman stated:
I do what I do, knowing my rights. Someone given her
rights knows that that country has peace. Without my

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

USAID, supra note 151, at 6.

174.

MARIE O'REILLY, WHY WOMEN? INCLUSIVE SECURITY AND PEACEFUL

Id.
Id.
Burnet, supranote 117, at 305.
See CUTURA, supra note 155, at 6.
Burnet, supranote 117, at 312.

SOCIETIES 4 (Oct. 2015), https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/06/Why-Women-Report-2017.pdf.
175. CONNIE PECK, SUSTAINABLE PEACE: THE ROLE OF THE UN AND
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PREVENTING CONFLICT 3 (1998).

176.

Mary Caprioli & Mark A. Boyer, Gender, Violence, and International

Crisis, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 503, 514 (2001).

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW

394

rights, the country has no peace ...

A.

[Vol. 28:2

.177

LESSONS FROM RWANDA: FACTORS UNDERPINNING PEACE

Without question, the factors contributing to lasting peace
are complex, particularly in a country that has endured what
Rwandan has. Female representation in government can
facilitate sustainable peace, 178 and there also is a rich literature
on how commerce can also support it.179 Professors Tim Fort and
Cynthia Schipani have isolated several of the elements of
commerce that promote peace, including economic development,
two-track diplomacy, supporting the rule of law, and
encouraging community development. 180 In the subsections
below, we tie these elements back to the impact of female
entrepreneurs on peace in Rwanda. 181
1.

Economic Development

Poverty is often

at the

heart

of conflict.1 82 Economic

development, therefore, is essential for sustainable peace. 183 In
Rwanda and around the world, female entrepreneurs 184 are

177. Paula C. Herring, Business and Economic Empowerment: Stories from
Women of Rwanda 75 (2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Fielding
Graduate University) (on file with the author).
178. Caprioli & Boyer, supra note 176, at 514.
179. TIMOTHY L. FORT, BUSINESS, INTEGRITY, AND PEACE: BEYOND
GEOPOLITICAL AND DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARIES (2007); Katharina Felgenhauer,

Peace Economics: Private Sector Business Involvement in Conflict Prevention, 2
NEW SCH. ECON. REV. 38, 38 (2007).
180. TIMOTHY L. FORT & CYNTHIA A. SCHIPANI, THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN
FOSTERING PEACEFUL SOCIETIES 109 (2004) [hereinafter FORT & SCHIPANI,
THE ROLE OF BUSINESS].

181.

Id.

182.

ANTHONY OBERSCHALL, CONFLICT AND PEACE BUILDING IN DIVIDED

SOCIETIES: RESPONSES TO ETHNIC VIOLENCE (2007); Nat J. Colletta et al.,
Security, Poverty Reduction & Sustainable Development: Challenges for the
New Millennium (World Bank: Social Dev. Dep't, Working Paper, Report No.
27093, 1999), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/68400146876237154
7/Security-Poverty-reduction-and-sustainable-development-challenges-for-thenew-millennium (detailing the links between economic underdevelopment and
violence).
183. Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of the Corporationin
Fostering Sustainable Peace, 390 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 409 (2002).
184. When we speak of "entrepreneurs" in this Article, we are referring to
individuals who "create jobs and increase income among individuals as well as
raising the standards of living among citizens." Sedina B. Misango & Orpha K.
Ongiti, Do Women EntrepreneursPlay a Role in Reducing Poverty? A Case in
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often at the forefront of helping reduce poverty. 18 5 They act as
changemakers within their families, and they reinvest their
earnings in their families' health, education, and nutrition at a
rate much higher than men (ninety percent versus thirty to forty
percent).18 6 Women also "inspire others to become self-reliant
and take up entrepreneurship."1 87 And they contribute to the tax
base, which in turn helps support the infrastructure essential
for economic development.18 8
One feature of Rwandan business is the prevalence of
cooperatives as a corporate governance structure. In Rwanda,
women comprise fifty to sixty percent of cooperative members. 189
Because cooperatives are largely decentralized, they open the
way for the inclusion of multiple perspectives and voices. "As of
2004, there were about 300 cooperatives in Rwanda, which
receive support from government, including business ideas,
premises, training, and advice on issues such as securing
financing." 190 Cooperatives, by definition, are a form of business
organization that represents true democratic ideals, and allow
for broad participation and representation among members. In
this way, the cooperative is a business form that embodies many
of the same values as that of gacaca, and that may seem very
familiar to the women of Rwanda. For example, cooperatives
work on the theory of collective, or community, decision-making.
Collective decision-making reflects the ideals of deliberative

Kenya, 2 INT'L REV. MGMT. & Bus. RES. 87, 88 (2013; see also Elishiba Njambi
Kimani & Donald Kisilu Kombo, Gender and Poverty Reduction: A Kenyan
Context, 5 EDUC. RES. & REV. 24 (2010).
185. CUTURA, supra note 154, at 5; Misango & Ongiti, supra note 184;
Mutambuka Deo et al., The Contributionof Women Entrepreneurshipin Family
Socio-Economic Development in Rural Areas, Rwanda, 7 INT'L J. INNOVATION,
MGMT. & TECH. 256, 256 (2016) (finding that there is a "positive and strong
relationship between women entrepreneurship and family socio-economic
development.").
186. Jackie VanderBrug, The Global Rise of Female Entrepreneurs, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Sept. 4, 2013), https://hbr.org/20 13/09/global-rise-of-femaleentrepreneurs.

187. Hina Shah & Punit Saurabh, Women Entrepreneurs in Developing
Nations: Growth and Replication Strategies and Their Impact on Poverty
Alleviation, 5 TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. REV. 34, 34 (2015).
188. FORT & SCHIPANI, THE ROLE OF BUSINESS, supra note 180, at 123. It
should be mentioned, however, that high tax rates in Rwanda are often cited as
a challenge to female entrepreneurs. See Simon Nsengimana et al., The
Sustainability of Businesses in Kigali, Rwanda: An Analysis of the Barriers
Faced by Women Entrepreneurs,9 SUSTAINABILITY 1372 (2017).
189. CUTURA, supra note 154, at 10.
190. Id.
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democracy, in particular the ideals of reason-giving and
accessibility. 19 1 Effective reason-giving involves appealing "to
principles that individuals who are trying to find fair terms of
cooperation cannot reasonably reject."1 92 Deliberating key
decisions in an organization should start from a place of mutual
respect; to achieve this, participants must be given an
opportunity to understand both the issues and contents of
arguments. 193
2. Two-Track Diplomacy
Business also opens the way for two-track diplomacy, which
is the "unofficial interaction among non-state actors with the
goal of creating an environment in which political leaders are
freer to reach accord." 194 With two-track diplomacy, women
entrepreneurs can act as ambassadors for their country and
communities, thereby improving reputation and connecting with
the global and national economy. Women entrepreneurs are
given the opportunity to represent Rwanda to the world as
business leaders. This is very important to Rwanda in
particular, given that the country is often referenced in relation
to the horrific acts of 1994. Thus, it is critical that women
entrepreneurs assist in the re-branding and rebirth of Rwanda
post-genocide.
3. Supporting the Rule of Law
Commerce also supports the rule of law. 195 Businesses
consistently use legal regimes to enforce contracts and protect
property rights. This reliance, reinforces the legal system, which
in turn helps resolve conflicts without resorting to self-help and
violence. 196 In Rwanda
in particular,
the
increased
representation of women on Abunzi courts, which deal with
sector-level disputes, helps promote the rule of law as women

191. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY, 3-7 (2014).
192. Id.
193. Thomas Christiano, The Significance of Public Deliberation 253, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
194.

FORT & SCHIPANI, THE ROLE OF BUSINESS, supra note 180, at 30.

195.

Id. at 125-27.

196. See generally JANE JACOBS, SYSTEMS OF SURVIVAL: A DIALOGUE ON THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMMERCE AND POLITICS (1992).
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become more confident that their rights will be protected
through the legal system. 197 In addition, as referenced above,
women play a critical role in gacaca and more formalized courts.
4. Building Community
Lastly, commerce helps build community. 198 Commerce
helps identify shared interests and promote the more equitable
distribution of scarce resources. 199 As the International Peace
Institute writes: "entrepreneurs, keen to protect their
businesses from the instability brought on by violence, can be
convincing peace brokers." 200 A study by Professor Tobias and
others also demonstrates how in the Rwandan coffee sector,
entrepreneurial activities improve understanding among people
from different backgrounds. 20 1 Work in the coffee sector provided
"new opportunities for people to cooperate across group
boundaries in pursuit of a common and purely economic goal

197. Pamela Abbott & Dixon Malunda, The Promise and the Reality:
Women's Rights in Rwanda 33-34 (Oxford Hum. Rts. Hub, Working Paper No.
5, Jan. 2015), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
OxHRH-Working-Paper-Series-No-5-Abott-and-Malunda.pdf.
However, the
Abunzi are not without their criticisms. Some argue that they are not properly
equipped to handle the complexities of the legal system.
198. FORT & SCHIPANI, THE ROLE OF BUSINESS, supra note 180, at 127-29.
199.

INT'L PEACE INST.,

ENTREPRENEURSHIP FOR SUSTAINING

PEACE

1

(2017), https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/1706_Entrepreneur
ship-for-Sustaining-Peace4print.pdf; Phil Vernon, Bread and Peace: Linking
Economic Development with Peacebuilding,5 GREAT INSIGHTS (Feb. 2016), at 4,
https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/Great-Insights-Prosperity-Peace-Vol5Issuel-February-2016-ECDPM.pdf; Peace involves more than lack of violence.
True peace is sustainable and encompasses notions of human rights, equality,
and justice. See generally PECK, supra note 175.
200. INT'L PEACE INST., supra note 199, at 2; see also G.A. Res. 70/1, pmbl.,
¶ 9 (Sept. 25, 2015) (stating that the U.N. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development is also designed to "strengthen universal peace" and one if its key
goals is to "promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full,
and productive employment and decent work for all.").
201. Jutta M. Tobias et al., Toward a Theory of Transformative
Entrepreneuring: Poverty Reduction and Conflict Resolution in Rwanda's
Entrepreneurial Coffee Sector, 28 J. BUS. VENTURING 728 (2013). Another
example would be the Cows for Peace program initiated in the Byumba
province. This program supported community-led dairy operations. As reported
by Mutamba and Izabiliza, "[c]ows are now used as instruments to promote
peace and reconciliation among communities that were affected by the
genocide. .. . Since every community member is a potential beneficiary direct
or indirect, every body feels responsible for the security of the cow. Neighbours
meet in the evening to talk and keep company in the home where the cow is
kept (Gutaramirainka)." MUTAMBA & IZABILIZA, supra note 106, at 38.
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that [was] not linked in any significant way to Rwanda's conflictladen past."202 Furthermore,

as trust among members of a

community rises, wages increase. 203 And this is a virtuous cycle
because
social trust further contributes to economic
development. 204
B. CHALLENGES THAT LIE AHEAD FOR RWANDA

While this Article has lauded the progress of Rwanda, and
particularly Rwandan women, post-genocide, it would be remiss
if it failed to point out that Rwanda still has much to overcome.
In particular, part of the reason Rwanda has seemingly made
such great strides is because there has been little room for
dissent among the citizenry and media. 205 While some saw this
as a necessary measure immediately following the genocide, 206
Kagame's regime has continued to stifle oppositional voices
within Rwanda. 207 Kagame has been in power as President for
fifteen years and was Vice President prior to becoming President
in 2003. Under the constitution, Kagame should have only
served two seven-year terms, which would have ended in
2017.208 However, his party passed a constitutional amendment,
with ninety-eight percent approval from voters, to allow Kagame
to stay in office until 2034, should he so chose. 209 In other words,

202. Tobias et al., supra note 201, at 28 (stating that these conditions
satisfied Gordon Allport's theory of intragroup contact, which enables people to
reduce pre-conceived judgments and lower negative perceptions of out-groups)
(citing GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954)).
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also Christian Bjornskov, How Does Social Trust Affect
Economic Growth?, 78 S. ECON. J. 1346 (2012).
205. See, e.g., Twanda's Paul Kagame-Visionary or Tyrant?, BBC News
(Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/10479882; Jeffrey Gettleman, The
Global Elite's Favorite Strongman, N.Y.TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), https://
www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/magazine/paul-kagame-rwanda.html.
206. Anjum Sundaram, Rwanda: The Darling Tyrant, POLITICO (Mar.Apr.
2014), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/rwanda-paulkagame-americas-darling-tyrant-103963.
207. Kara Fox & Edward Kiernan, She Wanted To Be President, But Ended
Up Jailed Instead, CNN (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/28/
africa/hfr-rwanda-diane-rwigara-asequals-intl/index.html (detailing the fate of
Diane Rwigara, who was a presidential hopeful and women's rights activist
before she was imprisoned for allegedly forging the requisite signatures needed
to qualify to run for office).
208. Paul Kagame, Feted and Feared, ECONOMIST (Jul. 15, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/07/15/paul-kagame-feted-and-feared.
209. Id.
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Rwanda technically has not seen a peaceful transition of power
since the genocide.
This failure to ensure a robust democratic transfer of power,
combined with lingering poverty, shows that Rwanda still faces
many obstacles in the future. Hopefully the country can rely
upon its values embodied in gacaca and its entrepreneurial
spirit, described above, to face these future challenges.
CONCLUSION
Although the genocide occurred twenty-five years ago,
Rwanda's journey towards reunification and prosperity provides
many lessons for transitional justice and economic development
today. In particular, it demonstrates the profound impact that
women can have on a country and its economy, when they are
given the freedom to speak and participate in government and
business on equal footing as men.
Ambassador Swanee Hunt made the following observation
that succinctly summarizes the Rwandan national sentiment
after the genocide:
"When society requires to be rebuilt, there is no use in
attempting to rebuild it on the old plan," John Stuart Mill once
wrote. After its time of horror, Rwandan society did indeed
require to be rebuilt, and the country's new leaders seized the
opportunity to scrap the old plan and follow a new one. Over the
succeeding generation, they have not only begun to weave
together the rent national fabric but also designed a new pattern
for it, one in which women can fill the highest roles in all spheres
of life. 2 10
Indeed, without the "significant involvement of women,"
Rwanda "would not have been able to overcome the horrors of its
past." 2 11 However, women in Rwanda still have a long way to go.

They are still the primary caretakers of the country's children,
disabled, and the imprisoned. They also continue to work longer
and harder than men due to the disproportionate burdens in the
household the two genders share. 212 Yet the values instilled in

210. Hunt, supra note 111, at 156.
211. Jodi Enda, Women Take Lead in Reconstruction of Rwanda, GLOBAL
POL'Y F. (Nov. 16, 2003), http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/inequal/gender/
2003/1116womenrwanda.htm.
212. CUTURA, supra note 154 ("Men, on average, do 12.8 hours of productive
work and 11.6 hours of household work (also known as 'reproductive work'), for
a total of 24.5 hours a week. Women, by contrast, do an average of 14.9 hours of
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Rwandans as a whole, and women in particular, make clear that
the elements for a lasting peace are there. The values of gacaca,
of cooperative businesses and democratic ideals set the stage for
a robust community and society. The women of Rwanda provide
an imperfect yet informative model for the rest of the world to
practice entrepreneurship as a way of achieving justice,
economic stability, and peace.

productive work and 29.6 hours of reproductive work per week, for a total of
44.4 hours a week. The 'double workday' of women reflects a continued
imbalance in the burdens of unpaid care work carried out by women, coupled
with the fact that women predominate in the agricultural and informal
sectors.").

